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Articles
"Implied," "Inferred," and "Imposed":
Default Rules and Adhesion Contracts-the
Need for Radical Surgery
Peter Linzer*
[Nero Wolfe was burning his Merriam Webster New Interna-
tional Dictionary, page by page, because it no longer indicated
proper word usage. He also did not want to talk with the young
woman who had an appointment with him Nonetheless, he re-
luctantly allowed his assistant (and narrator), Archie Goodwin,
to show her in.]
He dropped sheets on the fire, turned to look at her, and in-
quired, "Do you use 'infer' and 'imply' interchangeably, Miss
Blount?"
She did fine. She said simply, "No."
"This book says you may. Pfui. I prefer not to interrupt this
auto-da-fg. You wish to consult me?"
-Rex Stout, Gambit 3 (New Bantam ed. 1973).
Interpretation, Intent, Implication, Inference and Imposition
I was asked to speak at this symposium because our great
friend and colleague, Professor Joseph Perillo, the General Edi-
tor of the Revised Edition of Corbin on Contracts, told Jim Fish-
man, the organizer of this gathering, that I was working on
Volume 6, which included implied terms. My volume is one of
two devoted to interpretation, and half the book is a chapter
entitled in Corbin's 1960 edition, "Interpretation: The Process
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., Cornell, 1960.
J.D., Columbia, 1963. Editorial Reviser, Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
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Called Implication." Like Corbin I believe that the most impor-
tant question in interpretation is simply "what did the parties
intend?" On this reasoning I feel, however, that much of "the
process called implication" has nothing to do with the parties'
intent, and really has little to do with freedom of contract. That
makes it all the more important and all the more vulnerable.
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,1 which gave me the ex-
cuse to talk about implied terms, is indeed about interpretation
and interferes not at all with freedom of contract. It isn't a very
difficult case, but it has nothing to do with implication, not as
that word is used in the English language, as opposed to
legalese. When we lawyers speak of a court "implying" a term
in a case like Wood v. Lucy, we really mean that it drew an
inference. The issue in that case, as we all know, was whether
Otis Wood had promised to use reasonable efforts to sell Lady
Duff-Gordon's products, and thus could defeat her argument
that the contract lacked mutuality of obligation. Though Car-
dozo wrote "[wle think . . . that such a promise is fairly to be
implied," he really meant that it was fairly to be inferred-from
Lucy giving Wood exclusive control over her products' market-
ing. Though Cardozo used the verb "implied," he wasn't making
any implications. He was simply using common sense to inter-
pret the imprecise language of the contract by drawing an infer-
ence. 2 The process of inference is certainly a proper tool of
interpretation.
1. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
2. Some writers have found his opinion to be sexist, from his statement that
"[t]he defendant styles herself 'a creator of fashions,'" and his description of what
she designed as "fabrics, parasols and what not." Id. at 214. See Mary Joe Frug,
Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065,
1084 (1985). Whatever Cardozo may have thought of women's fashions, his infer-
ence seems the only possible conclusion about this very shrewd business woman.
See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C.
L. REV. 415 (1988). [For more sympathetic views of "Lucille," see in this sympo-
sium, Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of
Noninterventionism, 28 PACE L. REV. 315 (2008).] If he had considered women's
fashions too trivial for the courts he would have found the contract unenforceable,
which is what Lucy wanted.
On the substantive issue, our fellow panelist Mel Eisenberg, raised interesting
ideas about someone offering a potential agent exclusivity without requiring him
to make any sort of commitment, just to get a chance, and concluded that this still
might create a binding contract. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Con-
sideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 649-51 (1982) (With respect to Professor Ei-
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As Nero Wolfe so pointedly implied, too many lay people,
and virtually all contract lawyers and courts, collapse "to in-
fer"-to deduce what might have been meant, but was not said
expressly-with "to imply"-to (deliberately) make an oblique
statement from which another person can draw an inference. 3
A moment or two later in the novel I quoted, after Wolfe refuses
the case, Miss Blount says that she has been told that Wolfe is a
wizard, and confronts him with "Does a wizard only do easy
things? What if you're the only man on earth who can save my
father from being convicted of a murder he didn't do?"4 Archie
Goodwin, his wise-cracking, but literate eyes and ears, writes:
"He was scowling, not at the dictionary. She had hit exactly the
right note, calling him a wizard and implying (not inferring)
that he was the one and only-after mentioning what she had
in her bag" (twenty-two thousand 1962 dollars in cash).5
The "implication" concept is further muddled because
courts also say a contract has an implied term when in fact the
courts themselves are imposing it. They do this not because
they have inferred that the parties "must" have meant it or
even "probably" meant it, but because our social system thinks
that the term belongs in most contracts. Sometimes inference
and imposition overlap. Consider Cardozo's words in Jacob &
Youngs v. Kent,6 another of his contract warhorses, where he
spoke of "[c] onsiderations partly of justice and partly of presum-
senberg's analysis, imagine a garage band that said to a famous producer, "We'll
hold off for six months from hiring anybody else to represent us. Just think about
it." Two months later they hire someone else and have a big hit. On Mel's analy-
sis, there could be consideration without the producer's promise to do anything,
and that conclusion is plausible to me. Of course a court seeking to uphold the
contract could find consideration without needing Mel's subtle thinking by simply
"implying" a promise by the spurned producer to give serious and good faith
thought to the band's proposal, or by finding that he relied on the band's promise,
but neither is what Mel was getting at, which is that consideration is a more sup-
ple concept than is generally thought or taught.).
3. Cardozo, of course, knew the difference. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,
129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921) ("We think the evidence, if admitted, would have
supplied some basis for the inference that the defect was insignificant in relation
to the project.").
4. REX STOUT, GAMBIT 4-5 (New Bantam ed. 1973).
5. Id. at 5. Rex Stout couldn't let it go. When Wolfe is asked, at the end, how
he knew who the murderer was he replies, "[IUt was an inference, not a conclusion
from demonstrable evidence, for I had none. The inference had three legs." Id. at
151. Those wishing to learn of the three legs should read the book.
6. 129 N.E. 889.
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able intention."7 He seems to be saying, implicitly, that you
probably meant X because you should have meant X. At other
times, however, the term may not coincide at all with the par-
ties' unexpressed intentions, for instance the implied warranty
of merchantability, where a seller of goods, no matter how un-
willing, is bound unless he has complied with the formalities of
disclaimer prescribed by U.C.C. section 2-316(2).8 At still other
times, what may originally have been a gap-filler, found by in-
ference, becomes a rule of law by imposition, as the Wood v.
Lucy rule did when it was codified by U.C.C. section 2-306(2). 9
Most of these imposed rules of law are default rules that
can be dispensed with by the parties if they choose to do so.10
Default rules are, to my mind, much more important than infer-
ences, though both are commonly described as "implied" terms.
It is important, however, to emphasize that unlike inferences,
default rules are not part of the interpretation process. To call
them "implied," even in the semi-barbaric legal usage of the
word, is to create a fiction that has little to do with an attempt
to figure out what the parties intended in their contract. The
process of imposing default rules as implied terms is lawmak-
ing, either by the legislature or by the courts. It is not done by
the parties.
7. Id. at 890.
8. "Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and
in case of a writing must be conspicuous .... ." U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (2003).
9. "A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing
in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by
the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts
to promote their sale." Id. Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. section 2-306 makes no
distinction between "best efforts" and "reasonable effort and due diligence." Not
all courts agree.
10. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-306(2), supra note 8. Others, however, are immuta-
ble, like the "implied" covenant of good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3). The Code
speaks of good faith as an "obligation," prescribed by the Code, rather than an
implied term, but traditionally it has been called an implied term of the contract.
See, for example, the foundation case, Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,
188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933), explaining that:
[11n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 167.
[Vol. 28:195
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But the very concept of default rules suggests a possibility
of choice for the parties. The term, of course, is an analogy
drawn from computers. You may or may not choose to change
the spacing in your word processing program from the single-
spaced default set by the manufacturer, and your failure to
make the change suggests that you are happy with single spac-
ing and have chosen it by your inaction. This is surely better
than having to make hundreds of decisions about margins,
spacing, type face, language and many other things every time
you turn on your computer. By analogy, goes the default rule
mantra, the contracting parties have chosen to use the off the
peg "implied" default rules rather than invest additional re-
sources to draft a bevy of clauses every time they make a con-
tract. On this reasoning, the parties have indeed "implied" by
their silence that they are happy with the default rule, while if
they change it, we are to "infer" that they have chosen another
rule that they deemed better for them."
"Implied" Default Rules and Imposed Contracts of Adhesion
The problem with all this is the use of the contract of adhe-
sion to dispense with default rules. Within the past year there
have been two massive and excellent symposia exploring the
problems of adhesion contracts and the process of opting out of
governing rules: one in the Michigan Law Review, entitled Boil-
erplate: Foundation of Market Contracts, 2 superintended by
Professor Omri Ben-Shahar, and since published as a book by
the Cambridge University Press;13 the other in the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review entitled Contracting Out of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and shepherded by Professor Sarah Howard
Jenkins. 4 Both are superb, and daunting. In them, thirty-one
thoughtful writers grappled many aspects of the topic, coming
from many different points of view.
11. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contrac-
tual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).
12. Symposium, "Boilerplate" Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 Mich. L.
Rev. 821 (2006) [hereinafter Michigan Symposium].
13. BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007).
14. Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contracting Out of the Uniform Commercial Code,
40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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The two symposia, and the many other articles on the topic,
are more than justified. Adhesion contracts, especially in the
age of e-commerce and click-wrap, are the most important-and
most dangerous-institution of contemporary contract law, pre-
cisely because they undermine "implied terms." At the same
time, adhesion contracts obviously can't just be abolished.
We're not going to negotiate with Avis's clerk every time we
rent a car.
Because of my concern, and despite the intimidation I feel
from these two symposia, the many classic articles on the
topic,15 recent articles outside the two symposia 16 and two
American Law Institute projects that deal in part with standard
forms, 17 1 want to look at how the law should deal with attempts
15. See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Karl N. Llewellyn, 52 HARv. L. REV. 700 (1939) (reviewing
OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH
AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)) [herinafter Llewellyn, Book Review]; KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960) [herinafter
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION]; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943);
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970); W. David Slaw-
son, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARv. L. REV. 529 (1971); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Re-
construction, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1174 (1983). An important forebear of these articles
is Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917).
16. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
627 (2002); Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 139 (2005); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Con-
tracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); W. David Slawson,
Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive Contracting by Stan-
dard Form, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853 (2006).
17. They are PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 2 (Am. Law
Inst., Preliminary Draft No. 4, Aug. 28, 2007) [hereinafter SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES]
and INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (Proposed Final Draft, May 14,
2007) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES].
The ALI uses "Principles" to describe a project that is more tentative and per-
haps less sure of itself than a restatement:
In light of the many percolating legal issues that pertain to the formation
and enforcement of software agreements, an attempt to 'restate' this law
would be premature.... Instead of restating the law, a 'Principles' project
accounts for the case law and recommends best practices, without unduly
hindering the law's adaptability to future developments.
SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra, at 2.
The Software Principles Project came about after the collapse of the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which was abandoned by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) after
200 [Vol. 28:195
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to dislodge implied terms by the use of contracts not involving
active and roughly even bargaining by both parties. 8 This in
turn forces us to look at the impact on freedom of contract of
both the imposition of default rules and their replacement by
the counter-imposition of adhesion contracts.
There is pretty wide-spread agreement that adhesion con-
tracts are heavily loaded in favor of the dominant party, that
the non-drafter or "adherent" either doesn't know of the loaded
terms or doesn't understand them, and that in any case, the
dominant party will not make changes in its standardized form
contract. Nonetheless, at one end of the spectrum is the notion
that if you don't read what you sign, or assent to something that
you don't really want or don't understand, you are bound and
it's your own fault. 19 In the famous high Victorian words of Sir
George Jessell, M.R.:
If there is one thing which more than another public policy re-
quires it is that men of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their con-
being passed in only Maryland and Virginia. UCITA itself was the successor to the
abortive joint venture of the ALI and NCCUSL, proposed Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code, intended to cover licensing agreements, especially those for
software. In the Introduction to Preliminary Draft No. 4 of the Software Princi-
ples, the Reporter, Professor Robert A. Hillman of Cornell, and the Associate Re-
porter, Dean Maureen A. O'Rourke of Boston University, wrote:
The issues of formation and content are closely related. UCITA suffers in
part from the perception that it legalized formations methods highly
favorable to software producers, thereby allowing them to dictate terms that
deprived copyholders of their rights while diminishing the dissemination of
information.
Id. at 4. They continued by noting that the interaction between freedom of con-
tract and contracts of adhesion was not limited to software, and that
"[aiccordingly, these issues are fair game for these Principles, which will likely
influence resolution of the issues in other contexts." Id. at 5. The Intellectual
Property Principles, which deal with similar issues, are discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 26-28, infra.
18. Called at different times, mass marketing contracts, boilerplate, form con-
tracts, or adhesion contracts.
19. No matter how he gussies up his theories in the language of philosophy,
Randy Barnett's lifelong theory of contracts has simply repeated this notion in so-
phisticated form. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002). I should say that Todd Rakoff, who is more generous
than I, described Barnett's article as "a pretty good straight-on attack" in Rakoff,
supra note 15; see Todd D. Rakoff, Commentary, The Law and Sociology of Boiler-
plate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1236 n.5 (2006) [hereinafter Rakoff, Commentary].
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tracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sa-
cred and shall be enforced by the Courts of Justice. 20
But as Fritz Kessler said pointedly, "'[fireely and volunta-
rily' should not be underemphasized." 21 A form contract from
which a dominant party will not budge raises serious questions
about freedom, volition and freedom of contract, itself.22 In a
similar vein, W. David Slawson noted that allowing the domi-
nant party to impose terms conflicts with the notion that laws
in a democracy are made by the representatives of the people. 23
Karl Llewellyn suggested that the non-dominant party really
agreed only to the "dickered" terms-primarily price, quality
and delivery terms, and gave a blanket assent to other terms
only if they were "not unreasonable or indecent."24
Other scholars, such as Todd Rakoff, have argued that all
terms of adhesion should be deemed procedurally unconsciona-
ble and should be struck down and replaced by implied default
rules unless the dominant party can carry a burden of showing
that they are worthy of judicial enforcement. 25 The ALI's re-
20. Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R.Eq. 462,
465 (U.K.).
21. Friedrich Kessler, Introduction: Contract As a Principle of Order, in
FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, CONTRACTS 8 n.30
(3d ed. 1986).
22. See Kessler, supra note 15.
23. See Slawson, supra note 15, at 530.
24. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 15.
Instead of thinking about 'assent' to boiler-plate clause, we can recognize
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in
fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad
type of the transaction, and but one thing more... a blanket assent (not a
specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may
have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of
the dickered terms.
Id. at 370. This passage, published at the end of Llewellyn's life, built on his ear-
lier pieces cited in note 15.
25. See Rakoff, supra note 15, at 1280. In a recent essay in the Michigan
Symposium, supra note 12, Rakoff restated his Reconstruction article's thesis as:
The burden should be on drafting firms to show their form terms were worth
judicial enforcement rather than on adherents to the forms to show the
terms were unconscionable; and if this burden were not met, the courts
should apply the general, legally implied default terms instead of the
drafter's terms.
Rakoff, Commentary, supra note 19, at 1235. He said further that he still thought
he was right. Id.
202
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cently completed project on Intellectual Property Principles gov-
erning jurisdiction and choice of law26 takes a similar but
slightly more focused approach. It makes valid a choice-of-court
or choice-of-law clause in "mass-market agreements" (its term
for contracts of adhesion)27 only if the clause "was reasonable
and readily accessible to the nondrafting party,"28 and specifies
some factors to consider in deciding "reasonableness."29
Against these critics, some others-especially believers in
welfare economics-have argued that adhesion contracts should
be strictly enforced, saying that those who can't get the terms
changed still have real choice, by choosing competitors who of-
fer contracts with different terms or by refusing to buy the prod-
uct. More recently, sophisticated apologists for contracts of
adhesion have argued that concern for reputation and consumer
good will and other rational business judgments will induce the
dominant party not to exploit every legal advantage. 30
I can sum up my position in a moment. The Jessell/Barnett
freedom of contract/consent to adhesion contracts argument 3'
was answered at length and long ago by Llewellyn, Kessler,
26. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES, supra note 17.
27. "Mass-market agreement" means an agreement that:
(a) is prepared by one party for repeated use; (b) is presented to another
party or parties (the "nondrafting party") by the party on behalf of whom the
draft has been prepared (the "drafting party"); and (c) does not afford the
nondrafting party a meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms.
Id. § 101(3).
28. Id. § 202(3)(a) (choice of court clauses); Id. at § 302(5)(a) (choice of law
clauses).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 41-46 (further discussion).
30. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts In Com-
petitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 830 (2006) (arguing that buy-
ers, especially opportunistic buyers, have an advantage over repeat sellers who are
concerned about their reputation, but that this imbalance can be evened by terms
that favor the sellers but that sellers will not enforce against "fair buyers"); Jason
Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-
Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consum-
ers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006) (arguing that "firms use clear and uncondi-
tional standard-form contract terms not because they will insist upon those terms,
but because they have given their managerial employees the discretion to grant
exceptions from the standard-form terms on a case-by-case basis," but calling on
courts to enforce pre-signing oral promises not to enforce the letter of form con-
tracts). See also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 679.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
203
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Rakoff and Slawson among many others.32 Adhesion contracts
are a bullying device, and "consent" to a bully is no consent at
all. 33 The argument that buyers will compare contract terms
and buy the product with the most favorable terms has a shred
of reality to it, but only a shred. Forty-odd years ago, virtually
all automobiles came with the same very restrictive "repair or
replace" adhesion warranty, which the New Jersey Supreme
Court famously refused to enforce against a car owner in Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.34 Today, car makers compete
over warranty terms, and it is fair to assume that a buyer takes
them into account. True, the car maker won't tailor its war-
ranty, just as it probably won't tailor interest terms, but it does
compete with them. Warranties and interest, if not actually
"dickered" terms are something like car colors. If you want a
shocking pink F-150 and Ford doesn't make trucks in that color,
you can't bargain over the color, but you can vote with your feet,
by buying a rival product, and you may well do so-for "non-
negotiable" items like color, warranties and interest rates.
But how likely are you to do so over arbitration clauses,
choice of law and forum clauses, limitations on consequential
damages and items like the famous cross-collateralization
clause used by the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?35 And
if an audience of law review readers is unlikely to shop these
terms, what possible chance is there that non-lawyers will do
so?36 When we move into the twenty-first century and consider
the intellectual property arcana included in the typical EULA
32. See supra note 15.
33. As Robin West showed us most spectacularly in her famous article on con-
sent by Kafka's troubled characters. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and
Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 HARv. L. REV. 384 (1985).
34. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). Doug Baird has a perceptive, if unsympathetic,
analysis of Henningsen in the Michigan Symposium. See Douglas G. Baird, The
Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 940-42 (2006).
35. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965). Baird also discusses this case perceptively, though with rather more sym-
pathy. Baird, supra note 34, at 944-45.
36. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1983), as described by Jason Johnston, argue:
[Iun a general theoretical setting [that] even a quite small proportion of
smart consumers who actually read and shopped for good standard-form
contract clauses could put enough competitive pressure on firms so that they
204 [Vol. 28:195
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(End User License Agreement) attached to software that you
can't install without clicking on the "Accept" button, the concept
of buyers shopping adhesion contract terms becomes ludicrous.
The more sophisticated argument for enforcement of adhe-
sion contract is that the dominant parties will use discretion
and not enforce the terms strictly against all customers.37 Ja-
son Johnston argues that the dominant party will favor the
knowledgeable customer who aggressively asserts his rights (al-
legedly an efficient result),38 while Bebchuk and Posner say
that sellers will reward "fair buyers," who don't push their
claims to the limit (apparently an ethical result).39 Both these
rationales-which contradict each other-were, to my mind,
dispatched with ease by Professors Margaret Jane Radin and
Todd Rakoff in their commentaries to the Michigan Sympo-
sium. 40 In either of these cases, giving the dominant party the
power to impose harsh terms, trusting it to use discretion has
an enormous impact on liberal democracy, even if we naively
assume that Citicorp and the like are benevolent despots. The
obvious normative question is why the dominant party should
have this discretion, why, in Radin's words, "[t]he law of the
legislature is being superceded by the law of the firm,"41 why, in
would adopt efficient standard-form terms (terms whose cost to the firm was
less than the value that consumers place upon them).
Johnston, supra note 30, at 862-63. While Johnston is satisfied with Schwartz and
Wilde's explanation, I think it highly unlikely in practice, and I see no evidence of
wide-spread favorable modifying of adhesion contract terms to deal with these
highly theoretical "smart consumers." Johnston seems to concede this. See id. at
843-44. See also Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Law, 68 VA. L. REV.
1333 (1982).
37. See supra text accompanying note 25.
38. See Johnston, supra note 30, at 881-82.
39. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 30, at 830. Bebchuk and Posner write,
with apparent straight faces, that:
The buyer side of the market consists of parties that-[because they do not
have repeat dealings with sellers and because sellers cannot easily share
reputational information about buyers]-do not have a sunk cost in reputa-
tion and hence have no incentive to deal fairly with sellers in the sense of
honoring the terms of the contract.
Id. at 829-30 (emphasis added).
40. See Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of
Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1227-29 (2006);
Rakoff, Commentary, supra note 19, at 1235-36.
41. Radin, supra note 40, at 1233.
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Rakoffs words, "consumers are forced to be nothing more than
supplicants."42
Adhesion contracts have grown in importance with the rise
of e-commerce and changes in mass marketing. In the old days
many transactions were really barters. You bought a book and
handed cash to the clerk. Any problems were controlled by im-
plied terms imposed first by the common law or law merchant
and later by the Uniform Sales Act or the U.C.C. Now you go
online to Amazon or BarnesandNoble.com and at some point
click on an overriding agreement that is supposed to govern
your transactions, and that changes many of the default rules.
You pay by credit card, subject to a long, printed agreement
that, according to its terms, can be changed unilaterally by the
card issuer. You download software connected with the book
and click to "accept" the EULA (often expanding the manufac-
turer's property interest under the copyright laws) as part of
the installation. Et cetera, et cetera.
So there definitely is a problem. The question, though, is
what to do about it.
The Suggested Cures
Todd Rakoff put the burden on the drafting party to show
that the adhesive provisions were "worth judicial enforcement"
over the applicable default rules.43 David Slawson suggests
that the consumer's reasonable expectations of the transaction
should be deemed to be the contract, 44 and that if the standard-
ized form gave the drafter "contractual discretionary power,"
that power's exercise "cannot nullify or contradict the con-
tract."45 The Restatement Second of Contracts, also building on
a concept of reasonable expectations, said that if the dominant
party had reason to know that a party nominally assenting to a
standardized writing "would not do so if he knew that the writ-
ing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the
agreement."46 All of these approaches are better than blind en-
42. Rakoff, Commentary, supra note 19, at 1236.
43. Id. at 1235.
44. See Slawson, supra note 16, at 871.
45. Id. at 876.
46. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (3) (1981).
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forcement of adhesion contracts, but they suffer from the vague-
ness of the standards chosen to apply across the board.
The ALI's project on Intellectual Property Principles gov-
erning jurisdiction and choice of law47 allows the enforcement of
choice-of-court and choice-of-law clauses in "mass-market
agreements" 48 only if the clause "was reasonable and readily ac-
cessible to the nondrafting party."49 That alone doesn't improve
things much, but the Intellectual Property Principles go on to
define "reasonableness" in terms relevant to these two specific
provisions, in both cases including "the parties' locations, inter-
ests, and resources, taking particular account of the resources
and sophistication of the nondrafting party"50 and adding as a
factor for choice of court clauses, the availability of online adju-
dication in the chosen court and its particular expertise;51 and
for choice of law clauses the closeness of the chosen law to the
agreement and the parties. 52
I don't find the solutions offered by Llewellyn, Rakoff, Slaw-
son, the Second Restatement or even the Intellectual Property
47. Supra note 17.
48. "Mass-market agreement" means an agreement that:
(a) is prepared by one party for repeated use; (b) is presented to another
party or parties (the "nondrafting party") by the party on behalf of whom the
draft has been prepared (the "drafting party"); and (c) does not afford the
nondrafting party a meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at § 101 (3).
Note that this definition is not limited to consumers. Whether it would in-
clude employment contracts, which Chuck Knapp includes in his valuable concept
of an "individual contract" is not certain, since employers may modify their em-
ployment contracts while retaining the most objectionable terms. Employment
contracts, though not completely congruent, raise problems very similar to con-
sumer contracts. On individual contracts, see Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out Or
Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 95, 120 (2006).
By this I mean not a contract between individuals, but a contract between a
flesh-and-blood individual, on the one hand, and a commercial enterprise on
the other .... [Flor our purposes here the contract of an individual worker
as contrasted with a collectively bargained labor contract has enough in
common with the ordinary consumer contract to treat them together.
Id.
49. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, § 202(3)(a) (choice of
court clauses); Id. § 302(5)(a) (choice of law clauses).
50. Id. § 202(3)(b)(i) (choice of court clauses); Id. § 302(5)(b)(2) (choice of law
clauses).
51. Id. § 202(3)(iii) & (iv).
52. Id. § 302(5)(b)(i).
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Principles to be of great practical help to the non-drafting party,
since he still has to go to court and litigate the issue against the
drafter, who is probably a repeat player and thus has economies
of scale and a much greater incentive to litigate the specific is-
sue.53 The easiest possible way of rebalancing the economies of
scale, the class action-itself more a windfall to lawyers than a
device for legal reform-has been stymied by arbitration
clauses in the adhesion contracts themselves. 54 The question,
then, is assuming we agree that contracts of adhesion are bad,
how can we do something practical about them?
Radical Surgery
The solution, I think, is not to try to deal with all adhesion
provisions, but to focus on those that are particularly bad and to
make them unenforceable per se; in other words, to make the
most important default rules immutable when no real bargain-
ing is possible by imposing an "implied" term on contracts of
adhesion that forbids them from changing specific rules. If
there is actual bargaining, the parties may do what they want,
but when a dominant party imposes its will without real bar-
gaining, the state should override that imposition and return
the implied term to power. 55
There have been several examples of specific restrictions by
type, rather than generic restrictions based on unconscionabil-
ity and the like. After the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA)56 was passed in Maryland and Vir-
ginia, four states not only rejected UCITA but passed "bomb-
53. The Intellectual Property Principles' additional clause-related specific fac-
tors in dealing with "reasonableness" may be more valuable in its specific area of
practice, where the non-drafter may be larger and more of a repeat player than the
typical non-drafter of an adhesion contract. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCI-
PLES, supra note 17.
54. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
55. My writings, and those of many others, have been immensely influenced
by Ian Macneil, who pioneered the concept of relational contracts. See Peter
Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts,
2001 Wis. L. REV. 695, 695 n.**. In this regard, the critical point of adhesion con-
tracts is that the relationship between the contracting parties is one of no relation-
ship at all, unless it is one of master and servant-and under the common law
servants had more rights against their masters than some adhesion contracts give
the non-drafting party.
56. See supra note 17.
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shelter bills," which made unenforceable provisions in software
contracts choosing the law of a state that had passed UCITA.5 7
The ALI Intellectual Property and Software Contracts Princi-
ples projects make an attempt in the direction of dealing with
specific problems rather than adhesion contracts generally, but
they do not go nearly far enough.
We have already seen how the Intellectual Property Princi-
ples made a start in the direction of clause-specific remedies, by
defining "reasonableness" specifically for choice of law and
choice of forum clauses. The reporters of ALI's Software Princi-
ples Project,58 while aware of the abuses of adhesion contracts,
state a sentimental regard for "freedom of contract,"59 but also
deal specifically with some of the more common adhesion is-
sues. 60 The choice of law clause must bear a reasonable relation
57. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs Shielding Local
Law and Those It Protects From Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 9, 84 (2006). See also America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda
County, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 710 (Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to enforce AOL's
choice of Virginia law (its home state, which had adopted UCITA), based on Cali-
fornia venue statute favoring consumers' residence). I testified in favor of a bomb-
shelter bill before an Ohio legislative committee, with no apparent success, though
Ohio did reject UCITA.
58. See SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17.
59. Software contracts create a wide array of new issues on the substantive
side.
One central issue is whether contracting parties are free to broaden or nar-
row the protections afforded by federal and state intellectual property law.
Resolution of this issue requires not only attention to contract law, but sen-
sitivity to the balance of rights created by intellectual property law. An-
other issue involves the limits of freedom of contract. What terms should be
stricken on unconscionability, public policy, or related grounds? A third im-
portant issue involves the appropriate level of quality protection for users of
software in light of the engineering challenges and diverse methods of pro-
ducing it, on the one hand, and defective software's potential to cause calam-
itous harm, on the other. A fourth issue involves the permissible range of
software remedies providers may employ, including self-help mechanisms
and remedy limitations.
SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, Introduction, at 5. All four of these catego-
ries may be affected by terms in adhesion contracts, which, in the case of software,
often involve "click-wrap" and other techniques that undermine even the shred of
autonomy involved in signing a tangible printed form contract.
60. The Software Principles also have to deal with questions of what kind of
contract is involved (sale of goods? sale of information? license? lease?), see
SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, § 1.06, and what constitutes assent (click-
wrap? terms sent after sale? barter over the phone or on line?). See id. §§ 2.01-
2.02. These issues, which are intimately involved with the adhesion issue, are be-
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to the selected jurisdiction and not be against the public policy
of the jurisdiction that would otherwise govern. 61 This, how-
ever, is nothing more than the present rules governing domestic
choice of law, 62 and is less specific than the parallel provision of
the Intellectual Property Principles. 63 A similar comment can
be made about the Software Principles' section on forum selec-
tion clauses. 64 Its provisions on disclaimers of warranties65 and
limitations of remedies 66 basically parallel Article 2 of the
U.C.C. These provisions are timid, and still require the non-
drafting party to go through a trial on the merits before getting
any relief.67
We need hard, formal, protective rules, not standards like
"reasonable," "reasonable expectations," "not unconscionable" or
"not indecent." We need rules, either court-made or legislative,
that make specified clauses illegal and unenforceable in adhe-
yond this paper, though the writer, as a member of the Software Principles Mem-
bers Consultative Group, has strong opinions about them as well.
61. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, § 1.13(a). The default governing law
is currently that of the place of delivery, id. § 1.13(b), though the buyer's residence
has been suggested as a substitute by a member of the Members Consultative
Group in a memo transmitted to the Group by the Reporters.
62. In fact, an attempt to allow choice of law not related to the contract in the
Revised U.C.C. section 1-301 has proven to be very controversial.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
64. Section 1.14 of the Software Principles allows choice of exclusive forum
unless the choice is "unfair or unreasonable" and includes, in what appears to be a
non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in deciding unfairness or unreasona-
bleness, that the forum is not reasonably convenient, that the agreement as to
forum was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, abuse of economic power or
"other unconscionable means," that the forum does not have competence to hear
the case or award remedies "otherwise available," or that enforcement of the clause
would be "repugnant to public policy as expressed in the law of the forum in which
suit is brought." SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, § 1.14. See supra notes 48-
53, and accompanying text for the parallel provision in the Intellectual Property
Principles.
65. See SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, § 3.06.
66. Id. § 4.01.
67. The Software Principles' treatment of merger clauses is better, both sub-
stantively and because it becomes important only if the parties are already in or
seriously contemplating litigation, since only then would the parol evidence rule be
critical. Section 3.08(c) says that for contracts of adhesion, "a term indicating that
the record is fully integrated or partially integrated should be probative but not
definitive on the issue." SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, § 3.08(c). This is
close to the position that I take in the Corbin revision, though I think the word
"probative" is too strong and should be replaced by "relevant."
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sion contracts,68 if possible with a requirement that the con-
tracts state prominently that these provisions are legally
forbidden and may not be included in a contract, even with the
non-drafter's consent.69 Certainly, we still need overriding
rules of fairness for adhesion contracts generally,70 and to catch
the new techniques that mass marketing contract drafters will
come up with, but we need to cut the worst clauses out
completely.
We need to consider which clauses are so unfair and have
such a great impact that they should be anathematized. My
candidates are first the procedural traps laid for lay people:
mandatory arbitration clauses, choice-of-forum and choice-of-
law clauses, very short time periods to file complaints. We also
need to consider restrictions on substantive rights. I would ban
or strictly limit the ability of the drafter to change contract
terms after execution. In e-commerce, we need to know a lot
more about restrictions on reverse engineering, unauthorized
usages and sellers' self-help by disabling software or Internet
connections against the will of their customers. Certainly, for
some of these provisions the drafters will argue that the provi-
sion is substantively justified, and should be adopted by the
law-maker as a substitute default rule. If the drafters can do
68. For articles pointing the way to this approach, see, e.g., Ian Ayres & Rob-
ert Gertner, Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 933 (2006). See also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract As Stat-
ute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of
Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction
Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV.
983 (2006). Of course, my ideas, like those of so many other writers on contracts
would likely never have developed if it were not for Stewart Macaulay's contribu-
tions over the past fifty years. He has always preferred results to elegant over-
arching theories. Results are what we're supposed to achieve as lawyers. Stewart,
at least, has always got this right.
69. Such a provision would prevent form contract writers from putting in un-
enforceable clauses to discourage uninformed non-lawyers from contesting the pro-
vision or to allow low-level "consumer service representatives" to use the
unenforceable clause to bully those making complaints. See generally Christina L.
Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and "Iffy" Contract Clauses, 40 Loy. L. REV. 487
(2006); Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361
(2002). Professor Kunz's article lists many other discussions of lawyers pushing
the ethical envelope in drafting adhesion contracts.
70. For instance, I would not bar merger clauses, but I would weaken their
force considerably if they have not actually been discussed. See supra note 67.
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that (and they have a lot of money to use to make their case), at
least a governmental body will have changed the default rule,
rather than just the dominant party.
An example of how this might work would be a ban on re-
strictions on consequential damages. Attempts to eliminate all
consequential damages are common in the battle of the forms,
and it is common for drafters to try to do this in adhesion con-
tracts. The existing rule of Hadley v. Baxendale7' already cre-
ates a default rule limiting the buyer to predictable
consequentials unless she gives notice of a special risk,72 and
the very concept of the mass marketing contract makes individ-
ual disclosure difficult or impossible. That means that the ex-
isting "implied term" already protects the seller against
unusual risks. The seller is left only with the predictable risks
he should be able to factor into his pricing scheme without ad-
ding boilerplate stripping his buyer of this modest remedial
right, which she has had for 154 years. 73 Perhaps the sellers
can convince the courts or Congress that their risk is still too
great; they convinced the revisers of U.C.C. Article 2 to give
them the ability to cut off consequentials to "remote purchas-
ers."74 (So far, however, only the Virgin Islands has passed Re-
vised Article 2, and it seems to be going the way of UCITA).
Obviously, there are many other candidates, and maybe the
drafters will be able to convince the rule-makers that they need
to be able to continue to take specific rights away by what they
call an agreement. But at least a body of government will be
making the decision, someone besides the drafters of adhesion
71. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.).
72. Restatement Second of Contracts section 351(1) limits recovery to what is
foreseeable as the probable result of a breach. Section 351(2) says that loss may be
foreseeable "because it follows from the breach (a) in the ordinary course of events,
or (b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events,
that the party in breach had reason to know." U.C.C. § 351(2). See also U.C.C. § 2-
715(2)(a). That the Hadley rule is a penalty default forcing a contracting party to
disclose factual information about its risks from a breach is shown elegantly by Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner in Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 68.
73. See Symposium, The Common Law of Contracts as a World Force in Two
Ages of Revolution: A Conference Celebrating the 150th Anniversary of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 11 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 225 (2005).
74. See Proposed Revised U.C.C. §§ 313A(5) & 313B(5).
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contracts and pliant judges mouthing platitudes about freedom
of contract.
It was Fritz Kessler who showed us that the term "freedom
of contract" had no business being applied to contracts of adhe-
sion, but I have always understood his 1943 Columbia Law Re-
view article 75 to be an attempt to neutralize the evils and
cleanse adhesion contracts so that what remained could be in-
cluded within traditional contract law, "contract as a principle
of order" as Kessler put it in his great essay at the beginning of
his casebook. 76 Kessler brought a European and civil law point
of view to American contract law, and helped to eliminate some
of the excesses of classical theory, but he had no desire to pull it
down, as is shown by his debate with Grant Gilmore in their
unpublished teacher's manual.7 7 The same is true for Llewellyn
and other critics of form contracts.
The great justifications of freedom of contract are the in-
trinsic value of the exercise of free will and the efficacy of indi-
viduals planning their individual lives as opposed to
legislatures working en masse. Neither of these justifications
has any relevance to contracts of adhesion. The mass market-
ing contract has nothing to do with freedom of contract: the non-
dominant party has neither free will nor an opportunity for in-
dividual planning. The only issue is whether the administered
terms should be imposed by the dominant party or by the social
system as a whole, speaking through the legislatures, Congress
and the courts. Those bodies represent us all, however imper-
fectly. Contract drafters represent their clients. I have no con-
75. See Kessler, supra note 15. The article was part of a symposium on "com-
pulsory contracts," which included several other article that are still valuable,
more than sixty years later.
76. See supra note 17.
77. See GRANT GILMORE, Introduction and Teaching Notes from Teacher's
Manual, in CONTRACTS (Friedrich Kessler & Grant Gilmore, eds., 2d ed. 1970), re-
printed in PETER LINZER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 39, 41 (2d ed. 1995). It is in his
footnotes (signed F.K.) to Gilmore's contributions to the Teacher's Manual to the
second edition, as well as in his introductory essay in the casebook, supra note 13,
that Kessler expresses his view that despite its flaws, classical contract is valua-
ble. See also Friedrich Kessler, Grant Gilmore As I Remember Him, 92 YALE L.J. 4
(1982). The Teacher's Manual was made available to contracts teachers but was
never published. I am happy to have served the profession by publishing excerpts
from it (including the "debate") in Peter Linzer, A Contracts Anthology 39-42 (2d
ed. 1995).
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fidence in the drafters or their clients as benevolent despots,
and, even more important, I have no desire to have private des-
pots running my life, however benevolent they may be. The an-
swer is not to try to turn contracts of adhesion into quasi-
negotiated contracts-it can't be done. The way to bar their
worst aspects is by radical surgery, judicial or legislative. 78
I think that legislation, state or federal, is a more promis-
ing and efficient way to cleanse adhesion contracts than judicial
imposition.7 9 I have nothing against courts doing this,80 but
twenty-five years of conservatism has filled many of our state
courts and most of our federal courts with judges who are fond
of classical contract law and say that they do not "make" law,
despite the indisputable historical fact that so much of their be-
loved classical contract law was made by judges and the indis-
78. In the terms used by Professor William J. Woodward, Jr., this is a formal-
ist approach. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of
Forms, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 971, 1003-04. Professor Woodward made a strong case
why formalism is not a good idea for most business contracts, especially in matters
of interpretation, but his article was not concerned with "consumer contracts" (writ
generally), nor with the prohibition of specific terms favoring the dominant party.
I find it surprising to find myself favoring formalism. Formalism, however, is not
always something that favors the dominant, as any absolute ban on a business
practice shows. Cf Justice Hugo Black's view that the First Amendment's protec-
tion of freedom of speech ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech") is an absolute, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 57
(1961) (Black, J. dissenting). On the problems with "absolutes versus balancing"
with respect to the First Amendment, see Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther,
Constitutional Law 750-51 (16th ed. 2007).
79. Given the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Art. VI, clause 2, it will
probably take Congress revising the United States Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-14 (2006), to ban adhesive arbitration clauses. See Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (FAA preempts state law requiring arbitration
clauses to be conspicuous on the first page of a contract); Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984) (FAA bars California from barring arbitration of
claims). On both the evils of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts and the
need for federal legislation to restrict them, see Charles L. Knapp, Taking Con-
tracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761,
777-80, 787-98 (2002), and Richard M. Alderman, Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitra-
tion in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1264 (2001).
80. We can see some pretty radical judicial surgery in classics like Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (Justice Robert Francis for the
New Jersey Supreme Court barring a warranty implicitly excluding consequential
damages in a car sale) and Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (Judge J. Skelly Wright for the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit creating a warranty of habitability for residential property), not to
mention Cardozo's creation of products liability by eliminating the need for privity
of contract in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
214
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss2/3
2008] "IMPLIED," "INFERRED," AND "IMPOSED" 215
putable contemporary fact that so many politically conservative
judges are in fact judicial activists.8'
But, you say, what makes you think that Congress and the
legislatures will be any better? That's a fair question. The
Democratic leadership in the 110th Congress has shown little
kidney for a fight, whether it's over deadlines in Iraq, modest
restrictions on warrantless wiretaps or even Turkish culpability
for its massacre of Armenians ninety years ago. Why would it
take on every business lawyer in America to fix form contract
abuse, an issue that most Americans either ignore or accept as a
fact of life?
The answer my friends, is less blowing in the wind than
swinging like a pendulum do. I am a great fan of Grant Gil-
more, James Joyce and Giambatista Vico, all of whom believed
that history was a series of cycles.8 2 We were in a conservative,
Republican and business-oriented cycle from the end of the
Civil War until the Depression, the years of the birth and
flowering of classical contract law. Then we had a liberal,
mostly Democratic period from 1933 to 1968, as contracts be-
came Corbinized, Traynorized and Skelly Wrightized, followed
81. Obvious examples are Frank Easterbrook in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.
1997). Alex Kozinski provides further example in his attack on the California pa-
rol evidence rule (though he was Erie-bound) in his notorious Trident opinion. See
Trident Center v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
82. Gilmore, after discussing history's swings between the classical and the
romantic, wrote in 1970, "'It may be that, in this centennial year [of Langdell's
case method], some new Langdell is already waiting in the wings to summon us
back to the paths of righteousness, discipline, order, and well-articulated theory.
Contract is dead-but who knows what unlikely resurrection the Easter-Tide may
bring?"' GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 107 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed.,
Ohio State University Press 1995) (1974) (citations omitted). I have suggested
that Richard Posner was at least the John the Baptist of the resurrection that
Gilmore correctly predicted. See Gilmore's views on this question in Grant Gil-
more, The Ages of American Law (1977). Joyce's first sentence in Finnegan's Wake
(which starts in the middle and begins as the book's last sentence) includes the
phrase "commodious vicus of recirculation." JAMES JOYCE, FINNEGAN'S WAKE 3
(1939). This simultaneously describes the movement of the Anna Liffey River in
Dublin, makes a toilet joke and sends innumerable graduate students to the writ-
ings of Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744), an influential Neopolitan philosopher
who put forth a theory of history as cyclical. On Vico, see the Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy, Giambattista Vico, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
vico/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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by twelve years of moderate,8 3 but increasingly weakened presi-
dents and an activist liberal Congress, which produced some
important legislation affecting private citizens despite the
growing conservatism of the country. All this ended with the oil
boycott, inflation, the hostages in Iran and the election of Ron-
ald Reagan. For the past quarter-century, the Democrats have
sounded like Republicans, the Republicans made Barry Gold-
water into an environmental activist, and the law-and-econom-
ics boys and girls have done their best to paint Llewellyn,
Corbin and the like as wooly-headed idealists who never met a
payroll.8 4
But times, they seem to be a-changin' and to mix a meta-
phor, I think the pendulum is swinging to the blue. Now is the
time to start making proposals for legislative change, proposals
that won't get enacted this year and may not in the next Con-
gress or two, but eventually could become law. OSHA was
passed when Richard Nixon was President, the Family Medical
Leave Act when the elder Bush was President. Even in Texas,
where you scratch a Democrat and find a Republican under-
neath, in the early seventies a group of young Turks got the
legislature to pass an aggressive Deceptive Trade Practices Act
that has survived despite legislative and judicial attempts at
emasculation over the past 35 years.85 If I am correct, and we
83. I never thought I'd describe Richard Nixon as a moderate, but sixteen
years of Ronald Reagan and the younger Bush certainly show him in that light.
84. Referring to Justice Francis, who wrote Henningsen, supra note 34, and
Judge Wright, who wrote Walker-Thomas, supra note 35, Douglas Baird wrote
that "[a]t the time these judges went to law school, Arthur Corbin and Fritz Kess-
ler's efforts to understand how the law worked in mass markets, as primitive as
they may seem today, were state of the art." Baird, supra note 34, at 951, text
accompanying n.60. Baird is a little less patronizing in the footnote. For what she,
at least, perceives as Llewellyn's romanticism about businessmen's usages of
trade, see Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Questionable Em-
pirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 710 (1999); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1765 (1996). On Bernstein and Llewellyn, see Woodward, supra note 78, at 980-
81. See generally, Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of
Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 N.W. L.
REV. 775 (2000).
85. See also Richard M. Alderman, The Deceptive Trade Practices Act 2005 -
Still Alive and Well, 8 J. TEx. CONSUMER L. 74 (2005), available at SSRN: http:/!
ssrn.comlabstract=922790. Admittedly, in the 1970s Texas was still Democratic, if
pretty reactionary. Today it is solidly Republican, but other states have changed,
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do have at least a moderate swing a little to the left of center (I
am not predicting the French Revolution), this can create an
atmosphere where serious proposals to solve a profoundly seri-
ous intrusion on the average citizen could find a friendly recep-
tion. Now is the time to get our thinking straight and now is
the time to start to act.
I infer that change for the better is possible.
and even south-western Republicans could some day start caring about consumers
and workers, especially if the proposal got support from the growing cadre of His-
panic voters.
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